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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO, INC., an Idaho corporation,
PlaintiffIAppellant,
v.
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA LECHEMINANT,
DefendantsIRespondents.
Supreme Court Docket No. 36381-2009
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Madison County.
Honorable Brent J. Moss, District Judge, presiding.
Bryan D. Smith, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Appellant.
Marvin M. Smith, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Respondents.
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ARGUMENT

CBEI HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITIONALITY OF IDAHO CODE
SECTION 11-204.
"The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure
every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly
constituted agents." Village of Willowbrookv. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000). As explained more
fully in Appellant's Brief, a corporation is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Respondents do not dispute that CBEI is a "person" within this context.
Respondents have stated that "it cannot be argued that CBEI is a married man" and seem
to conclude that because CBEI is not a married man, it does not fit into the classification of
persons who can assert the unconstitutionality of Idaho Code § 11-204. Respondents do not
support this position with any law, and this position is actually contrary to existing case law. It is
well settled constitutional law that parties who are not members of a protected class have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute when the challenged discriminatory statute
has disadvantaged the party challenging the statute. See Haringfield v. District Court of Seventh

Judicial Dist. In and For Fremont County, 95 Idaho 540 (1973); RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of
Seatle, 307 F.3d 1045 (9thCir. 2002). In fact, Respondents in their reply brief have admitted that
"[alppellant correctly points out, this Court has recognized standing when a party has a 'personal
stake' in the outcome of the litigation. This exception to being part of the class for challenge

-
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purposes is found when the party requesting recognition of standing suffers" an injury, and there
is a causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct.'
In this case, as Respondents have correctly pointed out, the Court should find that
CBEI has standing if the Court finds that CBEI has a "personal stake" in the outcome of this
litigation and the injury suffered is the result of the challenged conduct or statute. In this regard,
CBEI has a "personal stake" in the outcome of this litigation: CBEI will be directly and
adversely affected if I.C. § 11-204 applies because CBEI will be precluded from collecting on
property in partial satisfaction of its judgment. This injury to CBEI would be the direct result of
the application of I.C. 3 11-204 if it is found to be constitutional. Because CBEI will suffer a
distinct injury as a result of application of I.C. 5 11-204, CBEI has standing to challenge whether
Section 11-204 is constitutional.
Respondents have incorrectly asserted that another "problem area" for CBEI is that there
has not been a violation of any "constitutionally protected right." This argument is wrong. As
stated above, the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person from
discrimination and to secure "equal protection" of the law. Thus, the right to "equal protection
of the law" is a "constitutionally protected right." Respondent's argument is also circular.
Respondents cannot logically argue that CBEI has no standing to challenge a "constitutionally
protected right" because there has not been a violation of any "constitutionally protected right."

If this were the case, then a statute could never be challenged on constitutional grounds because
a person would have to prove a violation of a constitutionally protected right before he could
make a challenge; yet, a person could not make the challenge unless he first had standing, which
would require proof of a violation of a constitutionally protected right.

' Brief of Respondents, p. 6
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Courts have consistently found parties to have standing to assert equal protection claims
when the underlying action is the result of unequal protection of laws not related to an
"enumerated" right. See e.g. Haringfeld v. District Court of Seventh Judicial Dist. In and For

Fremont County, 95 Idaho 540(1973); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
CBEI's constitutional challenge does not need to implicate an "enumerated right" beyond "equal
protection." Therefore, CBEI has standing to challenge I.C. 5 11-204 on equal protection
grounds.
11.
IDAHO CODE SECTION 11-204 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND DOES NOT BEAR ANY
SUBSTANTIAL RXLATION TO THE OB JECT OF THE LEGISLATION.
Appellant's Brief more fully explains that this Court has found that a statute that denies
equal protection of the laws guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment is unenforceable if the
basis for the different classification is arbitrary and not reasonable and the statute bears no
rational relation to the object of the legislation. See also, Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461 (1976)
I. C. 5 11-204 is unconstitutional because it results in the unequal treatment for a married woman
and a married man in regards to their various properties. This unconstitutional treatment is
apparent from a plain reading of I. C. $1 1-204 which states:
All real and personal estate belonging to any married woman at the time of her
marriage, or to which she subsequently becomes entitled in her own right, and all the
rents, issues and profits thereof, and all compensation due and owing for her personal
services, 1s exempt form execution from her husband.
(Emphasis added).
The only possible way that this statute could be found to be constitutional is to find that this
unequal distinction rests on some ground or difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation so that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike. Suter v.
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Suter, 97 Idaho 461 (1976). Although Respondents contend that Section 11-204 is constitutional
they do not explain how it is constitutional from either a plain reading or from its relation to
Idaho's community property system.
In fact, I.C. 5 11-204 predates the enactment of Idaho's community property legislation, a
fact Respondents point out in footnote number 1 of their reply brief. In 1881 when I.C. 5 11-204
was enacted, the husband had the exclusive right to manage and control all of the community
property except for the earnings of the wife for her personal services. McMillan v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 48 Idaho 163 (1929). In 1974, the Idaho State Legislature changed the Idaho's
community property law so that "[elither the husband or the wife shall have the right to manage
and control community property." See 1974 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 194, 5 2 and Idaho Code §
32-912. Therefore, as is explained more fully in' Appellant's Brief, I.C. § 11-204 bears no
relation and is actually contrary to Idaho's current system of property law having been enacted
before enactment of Idaho's community property system and "equal management." Therefore,
Section 11-204 is unconstitutional.
111.
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT TIMELY FILED A CROSS-APPEAL AND THE
ARGUMENTS CONTAINED IN SECTIONS C. D. F, AND G OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
MUST BE DISMISSED.
This Court has explained the following rule:
"Pursuant to I.A.R. 15 a respondent is required to file a cross-appeal if affirmative
relief by way of reversal, vacation or modification is sought. Although a respondent can
make any argument to sustain a lower court judgment, the respondent must timely file a
cross-appeal in order to seek a change in the judgment. In Idaho, a timely notice of
appeal or cross-appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to challenge a determination made
by a lower court. Failure to timely file such notice shall cause automatic dismissal ofthe
issue on appeal." (Internal citations omitted).
Miller v. Board of Trustees, 132 Idaho 244 (1998).
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The District Court in this case determined that "Sandy's wages are community property
and subject to garnishment, unless exempt." Specifically, the District Court held that "the
separate antenuptial debts of either spouse are payable from community property" and that
wages and salaries are community property." The District Court further held that Miller v.

Miller, 113 Idaho 415 (1987) is inapplicable and that Jeff Lecheminant's "antenuptial debt is
payable from Sandy's wages." Respondents did not file a cross-appeal on these issues but have
sought to have the findings on these issues reversed by first raising them in their Respondent's
brief. Because Respondents have not filed a cross-appeal, these issues are not properly before
the court and should not be considered. Nevertheless, CBEI will briefly respond to each
argument.

WELL-EST,\BI.ISWF:D
-.IDAHO LAW COMMUNII'Y PROPEICI'Y CAN SATISFY
UNDER
~ 1 . SEPAIWTE
1 ~
DEBT OF QNE OF THE SPOUSES.

Respondents contend that I.C. 5 32-912 does not allow garnishment in this case because
the debt and judgment arose before the formation of the current community. Importantly,
Respondents do not contend that LC.

5 32-912 does not establish a right in both husband and

wife to manage and control the community property or that the wages of either spouse are not
community property that either has the right to maintain and control. In fact, Respondents have
conceded that "there is no doubt that wages earned from the parties during marriage are
community property".2 The only argument Respondents raise is that the debts which are the
subject of the current judgment are not subject to garnishment because the debt was antenuptial.
However, the Respondents have not cited any law to support this argument and that position is
actually contrary to Idaho case law. There is a long line of Idaho cases that have held that the

2 Brief of Respondents at page 7.
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separate antenuptial debts of either spouse are payable from community property. Action

Collection Services, Inc. v. Seele, 138 Idaho 753 (Ct. App. 2003); Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170
(1995); Twin Falls Bank and Trust v. Joan F. Holley, 111 Idaho 349 (1986); Gustin v. Byam, 41
Idaho 538 (1925); Holt v. Empey, 32 Idaho 106 (1919).
Respondents have attempted to distinguish these cases arguing they are the unfortunate
result of a misapplication of dicta and that their uniform theme that community property is liable
In support of
to satisfy a separate antenuptial debt was not intended to apply to this sit~ation.~
this claim, Respondents cite to Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Joan F. Holley, 111 Idaho 34
(1986). Twin Falls Bank actually supports CBEI's position that a creditor can satisfy its
judgment out of the judgment debtor's separate property "or against the communityproperty
of" the judgment debtor. Id. at 353.
Respondents argue that it is unfair to attach Sandy Moulton's wages because she was not
a party to the collection action against her husband and his debt is antenuptial. Respondents
focus on the garnished wages as belonging to "Sandy Moulton," not "Jeff Lecheminant."
Respondents fail to understand that "community property" is not "her" or "his." Community
property is "theirs" thus making her wages just as much "his" as "hers." If Sandy Moulton
wanted a different result, she should have signed a prenuptial agreement making her wages
"hers" before she married Jeff Lecheminant and if she wants a different result in the future, she
could sign a postnuptial agreement opting out of Idaho's community property laws. Idaho Code
Sections 32-922 and 923. Additionally, Respondents' argument is in direct contradiction with
Idaho case taw which has recognized that "parties often marry with separate antenuptial debts"
and "those debts are payable from community property." Action Collection Service, Inc. v.

Seele, supra, 138 Idaho 758 and Bliss v. Bliss, supra, 127 Idaho 173. Respondents further argue
3 Brief of Respondents at page 10
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that the garnishment is essentially unfair and in violation of Sandy Moulton's due process rights.
However, Sandy Moulton has had the opportunity to object to the garnishment as this appeal
demonstrates. Therefore, she has not had her due process rights violated.
Because Respondents did not file a cross-appeal raising this issue on appeal, the Court
should not consider Respondent's arguments on this issue. However, should the Court find
jurisdiction to hear this issue, the law in Idaho is clear that a spouses antenuptial debts are
payable from the property of the community.

v.
N O Q H R E M E N _ T EXISI'S 1:IjAT A L>EB?'-.MIJS'I' BENEFI'I' 'THJ: COMMUNITY
HEI:ORI; IT CAN B.E SATISFIED OUT OI: COM.\lL'NI'TY P R O . P m .
Respondents rely on First Idaho Corporation to argue that a debt must benefit the
community before it can be satisfied out of community property. However, First Idaho

Corporation is readily distinguishable from this case. In First Idaho Corporation, the debt at
issue was a separate debt in the form of a mortgage note signed by the wife's deceased husband.
When the husband defaulted, the bank sued the husband and wife, who had not signed the
mortgage note. Importantly, the court dismissed the claim against the wife because she had not
signed on the note and therefore had no personal liability. The court also dismissed the claim
because the complaint seeking to hold the wife individually liable on a judgment did not allege
that the debt was incurred for the benefit of the community.
Here, CBEI has not sued Sandy Moulton and does not seek a judgment against her. This
fact makes the case of First Idaho Corporation readily distinguishable. If CBEI were to seek a
judgment against Sandy Moulton, CBEI would be required to show that she has personal liability
for the debt by either (1) showing that she agreed to pay the debt; or (2) showing that the debt
was incurred for the benefit of the community. Rather than seek judgment against Sandy
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 9
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Moulton, CBEI is simply seeking to satisfy Jeff Lecheminant's separate debt out of community
property that exists in the form of Sandy Moulton's community wages. Stated differently, the
court in First Idaho Corporation would have had a different holding if the bank had obtained a
judgment against the husband only and then sought satisfaction of the judgment out of the
community property held by the wife. Instead, the bank sought a personal judgment against the
wife even though she was not personally obligated for the debt.
Obviously, First Idaho Corporation does not stand for the proposition that a debt can be
satisfied from community property only when the debt is incurred for the benefit of the
community. Otherwise, First Idaho Corporation would be contrary to Gustin v. Byam, 41 Idaho
at 538 and Holt v. Empey, 32 Idaho at 106 where the Idaho Supreme Court applied the rule that a
spouse's separate antenuptial debt could be satisfied out of community property. In these cases,
community property was liable for a spouse's separate antenuptial debt that necessarily was not
incurred for the "benefit of the community" because it was antenuptial. Moreover, the Idaho
Supreme Court cited the rule in Gustin and Holt with approval and again applied the rule
(without regard to whether the debt was incurred for the benefit of the community) in Bliss v
Bliss, 127 Idaho 170 in 1995-some

six years after First Idaho Corporation was decided.

Finally, the Idaho Court of Appeals applied the rule that a spouse's separate antenuptial debt
could be satisfied out of community wages (without regard to whether the debt was incurred for
the benefit of the community) as recently as 2003 in Action Collection Service, Inc. v. Seele, 138
Idaho at 753. Accordingly, respondents' argument is misplaced.
Because Respondents did not file a cross-appeal raising this issue on appeal, the Court
should not consider Respondent's arguments on this issue. However, should the Court find
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jurisdiction to hear this issue, the law in Idaho is clear that no requirement exists that a debt must
benefit the community before it can be satisfied out of community property?
VI.
THE PRINCIPLE OF EXTENSION CANNOT BE APPLIED TO IDAHO CODE 6 11-204.
Respondents contend that the principle of "extension" should be applied to this statute
making Idaho Code 5 11-204 apply equally to married men and women. While it is true that
Idaho courts have approved the doctrine of "extension," "extension" does not apply here.
Respondents rely on three Idaho cases to support the contention that extension should be applied
to I.C. 5 11-204. These cases deal with statutes that compelled only a husband to pay child
support, allowed only a wife to receive alimony, and a different age of majority for males and
females. Extension was practical in those situations because the court could simply extend the
statutes to require a wife to pay child support, a husband to receive alimony, and change the age
of majority for males to 18 rather than 2 1.
The cases Respondents cite focus on the legislative intent,of the benefits the statutes
provided. In those cases, the benefits were related to the then existing statutory schemes of
providing assistance for raising children, dividing tangible and intangible marriage assets
equitably, and allowing males and females of equal ages equal rights. Extending the statutes
served the purpose for which the statutes were enacted. In this case, as explained elsewhere in
this brief, the community property laws of Idaho have changed and I.C.

5 11-204 does not fit into

the current community property system. There is no public policy for extending application of a
code section that does not fit into the current community property system. To do so would
simply expand an already ill-suited statute for today's community property system.
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Respondent further argues that the policy of an exemption also argues for the application
of the extension doctrine. Respondent claims that the underlying policy of an exemption is that a
person should be entitled to some minimum amount of property and income to maintain a
subsistence level to lessen the risk of a person becoming a ward of the state. Respondents cite no
law to support this assumption, but state that it "is the position of the instant author that havoc
would result from the voiding of Idaho Code

11-204." In fact, as explained in Appellant's

Brief and previously in this reply, the purpose of I.C.

11-204 was to provide the wife with the

right to manage and control her earnings from her personal services because the then existing
Idaho law gave complete control of the "marital finances" to the husband. Additionally, legal
safeguards exist to prevent a person from being over garnished or from becoming a "ward of the
state" including state and federal law that limits the garnishment of wages to 25%. 15 U.S.C.
Section 1673 and Idaho Code Section 28-45-104. Since Idaho Code § 11-204 applies only to
wages, the 25% wage garnishment limitation would always apply and thus havoc would not be
the result of voiding Idaho Code § 11-204.
Finally, extending LC.

11-204 would encourage further marital bankruptcy. For

example, if extended, LC. ?j11-204 would exempt from execution a husband's wages for the
debts incurred by his wife. Therefore, if a wife were to contract for a big screen TV for her and
her husband, but does not work and has no means to pay for it, the retailer could not sue the wife,
get a judgment, and execute on the husband's wages to pay for the TV that he himself watches
because his wages would be exempt from execution for her debt. Such a result would not
further any legitimate legislative purpose or intent. This Court should not encourage "marital
bankruptcy" by extending I.C.

11-204 to husbands.
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THE
-- I)ISTRIC?' COIJRT WAS CORRECT I ~ _ L TCONCLXSION
S
I'H_A A ~ I L L L & X
.MILLER,
113 IQAHO 41 5 (1987) IS INAPPLICABLE '10 THIS CAS:.
Respondents' argument that under Miller garnishments of all types are not allowable
upon persons who are not party to the judgment is incorrect. Miller is limited to its application
to those cases involving an order of "continuous" garnishment and does not even address the
issue of whether a judgment creditor can garnish the community wages of the judgment debtor's
spouse by some vehicle other than a "continuous" garnishment. Specifically, the court in Miller
based its decision on an interpretation of Idaho Code Section 8-509(b) which deals only with an
order for "continuous" garnishment.
Again, Respondents did not file a cross-appeal raising this issue on appeal and the Courl
should not consider Respondent's arguments on this issue. However, should the Court find
jurisdiction to hear this issue, the holding in Miller is clearly limited in its application to cases
involving a "continuous" garnishment.
VIII.

-- WEI.L-E~.~BI,ISI1ED
'I'HE
KL'1.E THA~SF<PARA'I'EANTENIIP?'IL~I.
DEB'fS CAN BE
SA?'ISFIED
01: COM.MUNTIY PKX'.CRTY C0KTROI.S THIS CASE.

0x1'

The reasoning ofAction Collection Service, Inc. v. Seele, 138 Idaho 753 (Ct. App. 2003)
and its progeny is valid and applies here. In Action Collection, it was the spouse with the
separate antenuptial debt whose community wages were being garnished. The court allowed
the garnishment because the wages being garnished were clearly community property. Although
Sandy Moulton is not the judgment debtor in this case, her wages are clearly community
property like those at issue in Action Collection. It is of no consequence who provides the
"community wages" that become community property because Idaho community property has
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never treated community property differently depending on whose effort produces the
community property unless the parties have entered into a prenuptial agreement altering the
nature or classification of wages earned during marriage. Accordingly, this Court should apply
the rule that community property can be used to satisfy a spouse's separate antenuptial debt.
Again, Respondents did not file a cross-appeal raising this issue on appeal and the Court
should not consider Respondent's arguments on this issue. However, should the Court find
jurisdiction to hear this issue, the rule reaffirmed in Action Collection Service, Inc. should be
applied.
IX.
CBEI IS EN'I'UI'LED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES U r n
IDA110 CODlr
..-.
SECI'ION 12-12_015),
Respondent argues that attorney's fees should not be awarded because the claim of
exemption was filed by two parties who were not named defendants and who have not received
demand letters. Apparently, Respondents assume that CBEI is seeking fees from EIRMC and
Sandy Moulton. However, CBEI has never implied that it seeks fees from EIRMC or Sandy
Moulton. The clear language of Idaho Code Section 12-120(5) requires a court to award
reasonable attorney's fees and costs to a party for attempting to collect on a judgment. The
statute does not differentiate between the costs incurred in collecting on the judgment based on
the parties challenging the creditor's actions. Because attorney fees and costs have been incurred
to collect on the judgment, attorney's fees should be awarded against Jeff and Lisa Lecheminant
regardless of the outcome of this appeal.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's Memorandum
Decision affirming the decision of the magistrate court denying CBEI's motion to contest claim
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 14
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of exemption and remand this case with instructions for the magistrate court to grant CBEI's
motion.

/of

1

/

RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this -

August, 2009.

SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCI

~ t i o r n e for
~ s Appellant,
Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

k4-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this/*
day of August, 2009, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief to be served, by placing the same in a sealed
envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile
transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:
Marvin M. Smith, Esq.
SMITH & BANKS, PLLC
591 Park Avenue, Suite 202
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

[ ] U. S. Mail
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